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With Friends Like You, Who Needs a Jury? A Response to the
Legitimization of Conceding a Client's Guilt*
INTRODUCTION
"Of all of the rights that an accused person has, the right to be repre-
sented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability
to assert any other rights he may have."1
Joe Elton Nixon was charged with murder and desperately needed
an attorney to protect his rights. Nixon had a low IQ and had suffered
from multiple mental and emotional disabilities throughout his life,
which had required periodic psychiatric treatment. Nixon's behavior
was sometimes erratic and uncooperative.2 When Nixon was arrested
in 1984 for the murder of a Tallahassee woman, the court appointed an
attorney to defend him against Florida's prosecution.3 Preserving his
constitutional right to a fair trial, Nixon entered a plea of not guilty.4
Nixon's court-appointed attorney stood before the jury on the first day
of his murder trial, however, and delivered a staggering opening state-
ment.' Without Nixon's consent, his attorney told the jury that Nixon
indeed was guilty of the murder beyond a reasonable doubt.6 The
opening statement conceding his guilt was followed by a sparse cross-
examination of a few of the state's witnesses and no defense at all.7
* The author expresses her sincere appreciation to Professor Greg Wallace of the
Campbell Law School faculty for his guidance in preparing this Comment for
publication.
1. Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1,
8 (1956).
2. See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 183-85 (2004) (reversing Florida Supreme
Court's judgment that defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel), remanded
to Nixon v. State, 932 So.2d 1009 (Fla. 2006) (affirming conviction, denying rehearing
and denying habeas relief). See also Nixon v. State, 857 So.2d 172, 187 (Fla. 2003);
Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So.2d 618, 625 (Fla. 2000).
3. See Nixon v. State, 572 So.2d 1336 (Fla. 1990), rev'd, 857 So.2d 172 (Fla.
2003), rev'd, Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004), remanded to Nixon v. State, 932
So.2d 1009 (Fla. 2006).
4. Id.
5. Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So.2d 618 (Fla. 2000) (remanding for evidentiary
hearing to determine if Nixon consented to the concession of guilt and denying direct
appeal); see also Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004).
6. Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So.2d 618 (Fla. 2000).
7. See Nixon v. State, 857 So.2d 172, 187 (Fla. 2003); rev'd, Florida v. Nixon, 543
U.S. 175, 183 (2004); remanded to Nixon v. State, 932 So.2d 1009 (Fla. 2006).
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The advocacy of Nixon's attorney was all that stood between
Nixon and the death penalty, but Nixon's attorney unilaterally decided
that he would determine guilt rather than allow a jury of Nixon's peers
to make this determination. Intended as a strategy to preserve credi-
bility for the sentencing phase, the attorney's concession instead
removed all question of guilt and any need for hesitation in sentenc-
ing.8 With all lingering doubt of guilt removed in the minds of jurors,
Joe Elton Nixon was convicted of murder and then sentenced to death
after only three hours of jury deliberation.9
The United States Supreme Court announced a sweeping rule in
Florida v. Nixon that the concession of a defendant's guilt by his own
attorney without express consent is not presumed to be prejudicial to
the defendant and does not deprive the defendant of his Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel. 10 The ruling overturned the Florida Supreme
Court, which had determined that a lawyer who concedes a defen-
dant's guilt in the absence of explicit authorization has deprived the
defendant of the effective assistance of counsel." The final ruling in
Nixon is based upon a case with graphically compelling facts, 2 thus
the precedent it established may be limited by those facts and the over-
whelming evidence of Nixon's guilt. If interpreted broadly or
extended, however, Nixon may take the legal profession one more step
down the road of blind deference to criminal defense lawyers at the
great expense of the constitutional rights of the accused defendants.
In response to the potential impact of the Nixon decision on the
important Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel for the accused,
this comment reviews the current legal standard and then advances
two proposals. First, Nixon should be narrowly interpreted, because
permitting attorneys to concede guilt without client consent is com-
pletely inconsistent with the protections afforded guilty pleas and con-
fessions and further weakens the constitutional protection of effective
8. See William Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death:
Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 Am. J. CRIM. L. 1, 28 (1988);
Michael Mello & Ruthann Robson,Judge Over Jury: Florida's Practice of Imposing Death
Over Life in Capital Cases, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 31, 59-60 (1985); Lawrence T. White,
Juror Decision-Making in the Capital Penalty Trial, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 113, 123-26
(1987).
9. See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 184 (2004) (citing 21 Record 4013).
10. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175.
11. Nixon v. State, 857 So.2d 172, 174 (Fla. 2003), rev'd, Florida v. Nixon, 543
U.S. 175 (2004), remanded to Nixon v. State, 932 So.2d 1009 (Fla. 2006).
12. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (affirming Nixon's sentence and conviction of murder
after presentation of unchallenged prosecution evidence that Nixon tied the victim to
a tree with jumper cables and killed her by setting her on fire while she was still alive).
138 [Vol. 29:137
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assistance of counsel. Second, the American Bar Association and state
bar associations should specifically require express consent prior to a
lawyer conceding a client's guilt as a matter of professional ethics
within the Rules of Professional Conduct to more clearly and consist-
ently define an acceptable standard of professional conduct.
BACKGROUND
I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees certain
rights to those who stand accused of a crime.13 One of the rights pro-
tected within the Sixth Amendment is the right "to have the Assistance
of Counsel" for the defense of the accused.' 4 The right to have an
attorney when accused of a crime was a late development in English
law, but this right was enforced and protected early in the development
of the American legal system. 15
Criminal defendants in American courts have long had the right
to privately retained counsel. 16 It was not until 1932, however, that
the constitutional right of an indigent defendant to court appointed
counsel was first announced.' 7 In the landmark case Powell v. Ala-
bama, the Supreme Court asserted that the right to counsel is an
essential constitutional guarantee, and the Court explicitly described
the inability of an average defendant to protect himself in a criminal
trial without representation.' 8 This language was strengthened by
13. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence.").
14. Id.
15. Schaefer, supra note 1, at 8.
16. Id.
17. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
18. Id. at 68-69 ("The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged
with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the
indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the
aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible.
He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though
2006] 139
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Johnson v. Zerbst, in which the Court asserted the defendant's effective
assistance of counsel as a prerequisite to jurisdiction of the court to
hear a criminal case.19 Further, in Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme
Court extended the right to effective counsel in criminal trials to state
proceedings by incorporation of the Sixth Amendment through the
Fourteenth Amendment and mandated appointed counsel to ensure a
fair criminal trial.2 °
The Court has also noted that the constitutional right to counsel
has some demands on the nature of representation. 21 The right to the
assistance of effective counsel is implied in the enumerated "right to
counsel" guaranteed by the Constitution.22 In Avery v. Alabama, the
Court noted that the right to counsel is not satisfied by the mere for-
mality of simply appointing an attorney.23 In Strickland v. Washington,
the Court went further, stating that the entire purpose of the right to
counsel is to guarantee assistance from the attorney that is sufficient
to warrant the defendant's uncompromised reliance on the
proceeding.24
he had a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him.").
19. 304 U.S. 458, 467-68 (1938) ("Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally
entitles one charged with crime to the assistance of counsel, compliance with this
constitutional mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court's
authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty. When this right is properly
waived, the assistance of counsel is no longer a necessary element of the court's
jurisdiction to proceed to conviction and sentence. If the accused, however, is not
represented by counsel and has not competently and intelligently waived his
constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid
conviction and sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty.").
20. 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963) (emphasizing the adversarial nature of the
criminal justice system and the need for defendants to have counsel but leaving open
the question of whether the ruling also applied to misdemeanors).
21. See Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759, 771 (1970) ("[I]f the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve
its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel, and that
judges should strive to maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys who
are representing defendants in criminal cases in their courts.").
22. See Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 445-46 (1940); Reece, 350 U.S. at 90;
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1942); Powell, 287 U.S. at 57.
23. Avery, 308 U.S. at 446.
24. 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) ("The benchmark for judging any claim of
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result.").
[Vol. 29:137
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II. THE CURRENT STANDARD FOR DETERMINING
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
For years, lower courts debated the interpretation of "effective"
counsel and assigned a wide variety of tests, resulting in different out-
comes among the federal courts of appeal.25 In 1984, the Supreme
Court responded by firmly establishing the current general test of inef-
fective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington. 26 For a crimi-
nal defendant to prove his attorney has provided ineffective assistance
of counsel under a Sixth Amendment claim for relief, a two-pronged
test now known as the Strickland test must be satisfied.27 First, the
defendant must prove that counsel's representation fell below an objec-
tive standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. 28
Second, the defendant must prove that the defense was prejudiced to
the extent that there is a reasonable probability of a different result
with effective assistance.29
The review of counsel's representation under the Strickland stan-
dard is highly deferential, with "counsel... strongly presumed to have
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the
exercise of reasonable professional judgment. '30 The evaluation of
attorney performance should reflect the attorney's perspective at the
time, without the benefit of hindsight.31 The challenging defendant
must also prove specific acts or omissions that did not comport with
prevailing professional norms.
32
25. Id. at 713-14 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (explaining in detail the path that led to
the Court's holding in Strickland, and describing the prior assortment of standards).
See also State v. Pacheco, 588 P.2d 830, 833 (Ariz. 1978); Line v. State, 397 N.E.2d
975, 976 (Ind. 1979); Hoover v. State, 606 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Ark. 1980).
26. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
27. Id. at 688.
28. Id. ("The Sixth Amendment refers simply to 'counsel,' not specifying particular
requirements of effective assistance. It relies instead on the legal profession's
maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's presumption that counsel will
fulfill the role in the adversary process that the Amendment envisions.").
29. Id. at 691 ("An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not
warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect
on the judgment.").
30. Id. at 690.
31. Id. at 689-90.
32. Id. at 690.
2006]
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III. "CRoNic" EXCEPTIONS TO PROVING PREJUDICE AND
THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
The Court also gave exceptions to the application of the two-prong
Strickland test on the same day Strickland was decided in United States
v. Cronic.33 While denying that the defendant in the case suffered inef-
fective representation of counsel, the Cronic Court described four cir-
cumstances in which prejudice to the defendant would be presumed
and need not be proven.34 Under any one of these four circumstances,
the defendant does not have to prove the prejudice prong because the
circumstances are "so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of
litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified. 3 5 Prejudice is
presumed, and the Cronic test is applied:
1. When the "accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his
trial";3
6
2. When counsel "entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case
to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial
of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process
itself presumptively unreliable";3 7
3. When counsel is available but "the likelihood that any lawyer,
even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance
33. 466 U.S. 648, 659-60 (1984); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. 668.
34. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-660.
35. Id. at 658; see, e.g., Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 267-69 (1984);
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504 (1976); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 798
(1975); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 563-64 (1958).
36. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659. This exception was developed and has since been
applied by the Court when attorneys were either totally absent or were prevented from
providing assistance during critical stages. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 89 (1988)
(applying Cronic exception to reverse judgment of lower court because defendant was
denied counsel during his appeal when the attorney withdrew completely); Geders v.
United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976) ("[A]n order preventing petitioner from
consulting his counsel 'about anything' during a 17-hour overnight recess between his
direct- and cross-examination impinged upon his right to the assistance of counsel
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment."); Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1061
(9th Cir. 2004) (presuming prejudice when defendant was denied counsel at the
sentencing phase, and remanding for new sentencing).
37. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659. See also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696-97 (2002)
("When we spoke in Cronic of the possibility of presuming prejudice based on an
attorney's failure to test the prosecutor's case, we indicated that the attorney's failure
must be complete"). See generally Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974)
(demonstrating the development of the Cronic exception and finding counsel
presumptively ineffective because petitioner was denied the right to cross examine a
key prosecution witness who was a juvenile).
6
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is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate
without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial";38 or
4. When the attorney's representation presents a true conflict of
interest.39
In practice, the most important battle to win in proving an ineffec-
tive counsel claim may be persuading the court to apply a Cronic
exception rather than the two-prong Strickland standard, due to Strick-
land's almost insurmountable burden of proof. 40 The denial of effec-
tive assistance of counsel is a very common claim on appeal,
particularly in death sentence cases. 41 A reversal for a successful inef-
fective assistance of counsel claim is exceedingly rare, however, "even
if the defendant's lawyer was asleep, drunk, unprepared, or unknowl-
edgeable. '' 42 The Strickland test has been criticized as "allowing slip-
shod representation of indigent defendants because it creates a
presumption that counsel was competent and places the burden of
showing prejudice upon the defendant. 43
Proving the prejudice prong of Strickland is especially difficult if
the attorney has, indeed, been ineffective.44 If the attorney failed to
meticulously investigate and present a compelling defense case, the
defendant is much less likely to have material with which to prove the
attorney failed "because the abdication results in an incomplete trial
record from which a court cannot properly evaluate whether a defen-
dant has or has not suffered prejudice from the attorney's conduct. 45
38. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-60. See generally Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53-54
(1932) (demonstrating landmark application of presumed prejudice when black
youths accused of highly publicized, heinous crimes were appointed as counsel "all the
members of the bar" six days before the trial, and the judge directed the one,
unprepared, out-of-state lawyer who appeared to proceed as best he could).
39. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan,
446 U.S. 335, 345-50 (1980)). See also Cronic, 466 U.S. at 662.
40. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to
Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV.
425 (1996).
41. Jonathan P. Tomes, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't: The Use of
Mitigation Experts in Death Penalty Litigation, 24 Am. J. CRM. L. 359, 361 (Spring
1997).
42. Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1 (2004).
43. Kirchmeier, supra note 40, at 427.
44. Heidi H. Woessner, Note, The Crucible of Adversarial Testing: Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel and Unauthorized Concessions of Client's Guilt, 24 W. NEW ENG. L.
REv. 315, 348 (2002); see also Abshier v. State, 28 P.3d 579 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001),
cert. denied, Abshier v. Oklahoma, 535 U.S. 991 (2002).
45. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 718 (2002).
2006] 143
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Without a sufficient record to prove that the outcome could have been
different, most claims for ineffective counsel under Strickland fail,
leading one author to claim that the courts "demean the Sixth Amend-
ment by employing the Strickland standard. 4 6
IV. IMPACT ON THE DEATH ROW POPULATION AND
SPECIFICALLY ON JOE ELTON NIXON
Death row prisoners are one of the most compelling populations
impacted by Strickland's extreme burden of proof. One author has
contended the death row population is "made up of people who are
distinguished by neither their records nor the circumstances of their
crimes, but by their abject poverty, debilitating mental impairments,
minimal intelligence, and the poor legal representation they
received. 47
Joe Elton Nixon is one of the current inhabitants of death row.
Nixon was accused and convicted of capital murder for the August
1984 death of Jeanne Bickner.48 The prosecution theorized that Nixon
met Bickner for the first time in a shopping mall parking lot and asked
for her assistance with his car. 49 Bickner agreed to give Nixon a ride,
and he directed her to a remote location where he attacked her, robbed
her, then tied her to a tree and set her on fire while she was still alive.5°
Her badly burned body was found the next day.51 Though no defense
at all was presented by his defense attorney in the guilt phase of the
trial, in the sentencing phase of the trial, Nixon's attorney presented
the testimony of a psychiatrist and a psychologist to show that Nixon
had an antisocial personality, a history of mental illness and psychiat-
ric care, a low IQ, and possible brain damage.52 Rather than mounting
a defense for Nixon, his attorney conceded Nixon's guilt without his
consent in a startling opening statement on the first day of the guilt
phase of the trial:
In this case, there will be no question that Jeannie [sic] Bickner died a
horrible, horrible death. Surely she did and that will be shown to you.
46. Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE LJ. 1835, 1880 (1994).
47. Id. at 1840.
48. Nixon v. State, 857 So.2d 172, 174 (Fla. 2003), rev'd, Florida v. Nixon, 543
U.S. 175 (2004), remanded to Nixon v. State, 932 So.2d 1009 (Fla. 2006).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So.2d 618, 628 (Fla. 2000), rev'd, Florida v. Nixon,
543 U.S. 175 (2004), remanded to Nixon v. State, 932 So.2d 1009 (Fla. 2006).
144 [Vol. 29:137
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In fact, that horrible tragedy will be proved to your satisfaction beyond
any reasonable doubt. In this case, there won't be any question, none
whatsoever, that my client, Joe Elton Nixon, caused Jeannie [sic]
Bickner's death. Likewise, that fact will be proved to your satisfaction
beyond any reasonable doubt. This case is about the death of Joe Elton
Nixon and whether it should occur within the next few years by elec-
trocution or maybe its natural expiration after a lifetime of
confinement.
5 3
After the State presented its evidence, the jury found Nixon guilty
on all counts, and then, after only three hours of deliberation, Nixon
was sentenced to death.5 4 After a series of appeals and remands for
evidentiary hearings,5 5 the Florida Supreme Court overturned the con-
viction and ordered a new trial after it found that the concession of
Nixon's guilt was the functional equivalent of a guilty plea.5 6 Based
upon that finding, the Florida court required express consent from
Nixon, but the evidentiary hearings had produced "no evidence that
show[ed] that Nixon affirmatively, explicitly agreed with counsel's
strategy. '
'5 7
The attorney testified that he used the strategy of conceding
Nixon's guilt in an attempt to save his own credibility as defense coun-
sel with the jury during the sentencing phase.58 By the attorney's own
report, when he discussed this strategy with Nixon, Nixon did not
respond at all, and "he did nothing, except after it occurred that he was
not real [sic] pleased. '59 Without the consent of the defendant, the
Florida Supreme Court found the concession of guilt per se prejudi-
cial, after applying the Cronic standard, and ordered a new trial
because Nixon's. right to effective assistance of counsel had been
violated.60
When the Supreme Court subsequently overruled this Florida
decision, one key factor was the Court's determination that a conces-
sion of guilt was not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea and
53. Nixon v. State, 857 So.2d 172, 174 (Fla. 2003), rev'd, Florida v. Nixon, 543
U.S. 175 (2004), remanded to Nixon v. State, 932 So.2d 1009 (Fla. 2006).
54. Nixon v. State, 572 So.2d 1336 (Fla. 1990), rev'd, 857 So.2d 172 (Fla. 2003),
rev'd, Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 184 (2004), remanded to Nixon v. State, 932
So.2d 1009 (Fla. 2006).
55. Id.
56. Nixon v. State, 857 So.2d 172, 176 (Fla. 2003), rev'd, Florida v. Nixon, 543
U.S. 175 (2004), remanded to Nixon v. State, 932 So.2d 1009 (Fla. 2006).
57. Id. at 176.
58. Nixon v. State, 857 So.2d 172, 175 (Fla. 2003), rev'd, Florida v. Nixon, 543
U.S. 175 (2004), remanded to Nixon v. State, 932 So.2d 1009 (Fla. 2006).
59. Id. at 175.
60. Id. at 176.
20061
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therefore did not require express consent. 6' After making this determi-
nation, the Supreme Court removed the presumption of prejudice and
applied the Strickland standard.62 The Court stated that counsel's
strategy to concede guilt during the opening statement, given the
weight of evidence against the defendant, did not fall below the objec-
tive standard of professional reasonableness even without the consent
of the defendant.6 3 As a result, the case failed under the reasonable-
ness prong of the Strickland standard based upon the Court's evalua-
tion of the weight of the evidence against Nixon.64 The Court also
discussed that focusing on the penalty phase is a practical reality of
capital murder cases and implied that an evaluation of professional
reasonableness under Strickland should be particularly deferential
during the guilt phase of a capital murder trial.65 Even though his
lawyer's strategy failed and he sits on death row today, the Supreme
Court determined Nixon had not been deprived of his Sixth Amend-
ment right to effective counsel.66
PROPOSALS
I. NIXON SHOULD BE NARROWLY INTERPRETED, BECAUSE LEGITIMIZING
THE NONCONSENSUAL CONCESSION OF GUILT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE
JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF GUILTY PLEAS AND CONFESSIONS AND WEAKENS
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
The precedent established by Nixon that an attorney may concede
a defendant's guilt without his consent should be narrowly interpreted
for three reasons. First, the Supreme Court's conclusion that a non-
consensual concession of guilt is not functionally equivalent to a guilty
plea does not withstand close scrutiny, because conceding guilt to a
jury effectively renders the trial a technicality and prevents true adver-
sarial testing. The Court's conclusion that the concession of guilt is
not functionally the same as a guilty plea produces the undesirable
result that a concession of guilt does not require the same informed
consent and procedural protection for the defendant. Second, even if
the concession of guilt is not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea,
it is analogous to an involuntary confession of guilt and deserves the
same legal protections currently afforded confessions. Third, the appli-
61. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004).
62. Id. at 192.
63. Id. at 178.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
[Vol. 29:137
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cation of Nixon in state and appellate courts should not be permitted
to further weaken the constitutional protection of effective assistance
of counsel.
A. The concession of guilt by one's attorney during the opening
statement is the functional equivalent of a guilty plea, because it
effectively waives the constitutional rights to trial, removing
meaningful adversarial testing, and therefore, should require the
consent of the defendant.
The Supreme Court decided Nixon based upon the preliminary
conclusion that conceding a client's guilt to the jury is not the func-
tional equivalent of a guilty plea, and in reaching this conclusion,
removed the need for Nixon's attorney to secure the consent of his
client.67 An attorney has an established legal duty to consult with a
client regarding decisions that are important to the overall strategy of a
criminal defense case, 68 but attorneys are not obliged to secure the
defendant's consent to "every tactical decision."69 In prior decisions,
the Supreme Court established that the criminal defendant does have,
however, "the ultimate authority" to determine "whether to plead
guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an
appeal."7" A defendant must give informed consent when his attorney
enters a guilty plea on his behalf, because he "simultaneously waives
several constitutional rights, including his privilege against compul-
sory self-incrimination, right to trial by jury and right to confront his
accusers."
71
1. Conceding guilt functionally destroys the constitutional rights to
trial by removing the doubt of guilt in the eyes of the jury.
To waive any constitutional right to trial, the defendant must give
a clear voluntary waiver of that right.72 A waiver of a constitutional
right must be "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege. '7 3 In fact, courts must "indulge every rea-
67. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004).
68. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
69. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-18 (1988).
70. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72, 93, n.1 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring)).
71. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
72. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
73. Id. at 464.
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sonable presumption against waiver '74 of fundamental constitutional
rights to trial and should "not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights. '75 The determination of whether there has been
an intelligent waiver of a fundamental constitutional right must be
assessed case by case "upon the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and con-
duct of the accused. '76 The Supreme Court in Nixon avoided these
requirements, including the need for clear consent of the defendant, by
finding that Nixon did not lose or waive his constitutional rights to
trial.77
The Court stated that the concession of guilt was not the func-
tional equivalent of a guilty plea and that Nixon's fundamental rights
were not waived at all, because Nixon actually still retained three con-
stitutional rights to trial.78 First, the Court acknowledged that the
State was still required to present admissible evidence to prove the
essential elements of the crime.7 9 Second, the Court determined that
the defense still had the right to cross-examine and could exclude evi-
dence even though guilt had been conceded.8 ° Third, the Court stated
that Nixon still retained his right to appeal.8 '
Each of these three rights Nixon retained is illusory, however,
when considered in light of the true impact of an attorney telling a jury
his client is guilty. The first and second rights were not truly retained
by Nixon because of the realistic impact of the jury hearing that the
defendant was guilty beyond any doubt from his own lawyer during
the opening statement. In emphasizing the important role of the law-
yer in building an effective story when representing his client, one
author has noted that "[o]nce a juror begins to envision events in a
certain context, new information will tend to be evaluated in that same
context. "82
74. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy to Use of Bogash, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937) (citing
Foust v. Munson S.S. Lines, 299 U.S. 77, 84 (1936); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474,
486 (1935); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930); Slocum v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 385 (1913)). See also Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412
(1882).
75. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937).
76. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464.
77. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 188 (2004).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. STEVEN LUBET, NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH: WHY TRIAL LAWYERS DON'T, CAN'T AND
SHOULDN'T HAVE TO TELL THE WHOLE TRUTH 5 (New York University Press 2001).
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When a defendant's own attorney clearly states that the defendant
is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in the absence of any defense or
justification, any effect other than a clear confirmation of guilt is diffi-
cult to imagine. Research on juror reactions has shown that up to 90
percent of all jurors have reached their ultimate verdict during or
immediately after opening statements, with all further testimony being
perceived through that initial impression.8 3 When the defendant's sole
advocate declares in his opening statement that his client is guilty of
the graphic crime described by the prosecution, it is reasonable to sus-
pect that many jurors will not continue to analyze the proof of each
element of the crime or even listen carefully to cross-examination of
the prosecution's witnesses. If the jury believed the defendant's attor-
ney when he conceded his client's guilt, then the subsequent presenta-
tion of evidence by the state and any cross-examination were hollow
technicalities instead of a true preservation of the fundamental right to
be tried by a jury of one's peers.
To say that Nixon retained the right to exclude prejudicial evi-
dence or to cross-examine witnesses ignores the realistic impact of the
most prejudicial of all statements being uttered by his own attorney in
the opening statement. The attorney's opening statement conceded
not just the elements of the crime but conceded the defendant's guilt
beyond doubt,84 which effectively took the case out of the hands of the
jury. As one author noted, "Concessions of guilt during opening state-
ments relieve the prosecution of its burden of proof."85 A reasonable
juror may assume that if the client's own attorney is convinced the
defendant is guilty, and then, the trial is realistically over before it
starts.
8 6
The third reason the Supreme Court held Nixon's constitutional
rights were not lost was that Nixon retained his right to appeal, but in
determining that the Strickland standard would apply, his only chance
at appealing the most prejudicial error of his case, his attorney telling
the jury he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, was arguably
destroyed. 7 Following a somewhat circular argument, the Supreme
Court stated that even with the concession of guilt, Nixon still retained
83. DONALD E. VINSON, JURY TRIALS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WINNING STRATEGY 171-72
(1986).
84. Nixon v. State, 857 So.2d 172, 174 (Fla. 2003), rev'd, Florida v. Nixon, 543
U.S. 175 (2004), remanded to Nixon v. State, 932 So.2d 1009 (Fla. 2006).
85. Robert J. Nolan, Note, Prejudice Presumed: The Decision to Concede Guilt to
Lesser Offenses During Opening Statements, 55 HASTINGS L. J. 965, 965 (2004).
86. Woessner, supra note 44, at 348.
87. See Kirchmeier, supra note 40.
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the right to appeal his conviction of guilt but then determined that
Nixon had not been prejudiced by his attorney admitting his guilt to
the jury because of the overwhelming evidence against him.88 When
the Supreme Court determined that the concession was not function-
ally equivalent to a guilty plea, did not require consent, and did not
meet the presumed prejudice required for the Cronic standard, then the
nearly insurmountable Strickland standard was applied to the case.8 9
The conclusions of law reached by the Court in dispensing with the
application of Cronic, however, also defeated the Strickland test,
because the Court determined that the concession of guilt was reason-
able and not prejudicial given the weight of the evidence. 90 Further,
any other issue that Nixon would appeal must use the same trial
record crafted by the same attorney who conceded his guilt to the jury
without his consent and removed all question of guilt before the trial
ever started, rendering the right of appeal hollow.
2. The concession of guilt is the functional equivalent of a guilty
plea because it dilutes the adversarial process, and the consent of
the defendant should be required before his attorney removes the
adversarial challenge to a guilty verdict.
In determining that conceding a defendant's guilt was not the
functional equivalent of a guilty plea, the Nixon Court also distin-
guished Brookhart, in which the Supreme Court had previously held
that a truncated trial was the "practical equivalent" of a guilty plea. 9'
In Brookhart, the petitioner's conviction was reversed because his
counsel agreed, without petitioner's informed consent, to a prima facie
trial in which evidence was not offered on petitioner's behalf and wit-
nesses were not cross-examined. 92 The petitioner had pleaded not
guilty and affirmed his plea to the court, but his attorney stipulated to
both a shortened proceeding and a set of facts which lead to the ines-
capable conclusion that he would be convicted. 93 With the trial being
a mere technicality, leading to an obvious conclusion, the Supreme
Court in Brookhart determined that the stipulations created the func-
tional equivalent of a guilty plea and therefore must have had the
defendant's full and informed consent.94
88. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004).
89. Id. at 184.
90. Id.
91. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7 (1966).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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The Court emphasized in Brookhart that the "petitioner himself
did not intelligently and knowingly agree to be tried in a proceeding
which was the equivalent of a guilty plea."'95 Similarly, Nixon did not
"intelligently and knowingly agree" to being part of a trial in which his
guilt would be conceded to the jury before the evidence was ever
presented.9 6 Nixon's attorney did not offer a defense during the guilt
phase, and by conceding his guilt in the opening statement, he effec-
tively contradicted Nixon's plea of not guilty.97 Unlike Brookhart, how-
ever, Nixon did not voluntarily waive a trial by jury and agree to a
bench trial, and Nixon's attorney did cross-examine some of the wit-
nesses against him.98 Due to these differences and the fact that the
Nixon trial was not formally truncated and shortened, the Supreme
Court found that Brookhart was not controlling.9 9
The Brookhart reasoning arguably still applied to Nixon's situa-
tion, however, regardless of whether the trial was formally truncated,
because the Court in Brookhart was most* concerned with preventing
the defense counsel for a criminal defendant from "overrid[ing] his
client's desire expressed in open court to plead not guilty and
enter[ing] in the name of his client another plea - whatever the
label."1° ° Rather than examining a technical comparison of the length
and factual details of the trials in Nixon and Brookhart, the essential
common issue is instead the dilution of the adversarial process by the
defense attorney when the defendant has exercised his right to plead
not guilty. Conceding a defendant's guilt without his consent has the
same effect of overriding the client's spoken plea that the Supreme
Court was determined to prevent in Brookhart and relieves the prosecu-
tion of the burden of proving its case even though the defendant has
chosen to plead not guilty.
95. Id.
96. Nixon v. State, 857 So.2d 172, 176 (Fla. 2003) ("[T]here is no competent,
substantial evidence which establishes that Nixon affirmatively and explicitly agreed to
counsel's strategy . . . Since we held in Nixon II [758 So.2d 618] that silent
acquiescence to counsel's strategy is not sufficient, we find that Nixon must be given a
new trial."), rev'd, Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004), remanded to Nixon v. State,
932 So.2d 1009 (Fla. 2006) (affirming conviction and denying habeas relief).
97. See id.
98. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 188 (2004).
99. Id.
100. Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 7-8.
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3. To clarify the need for client consent, the concession of guilt by
defense counsel should be deemed the functional equivalent of a
guilty plea, and a judicial colloquy should be required.
Perhaps the most compelling reason why it matters that the con-
cession of guilt was not deemed the functional equivalent of a guilty
plea is that this removed the protection of an informed consent require-
ment. Legal precedent has established that a criminal defendant's
attorney may not submit a guilty plea for an accused, and a trial judge
may not accept a guilty plea "without an affirmative showing that it
was intelligent and voluntary."'1° If an attorney enters a guilty plea
without the consent of the defendant, then prejudice is presumed, and
the Cronic standard is applied to any claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. 10 2 "Because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements
of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the
defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the
facts."' 01 3 Express, informed consent from the defendant should also
be required when an attorney is planning to concede his client's guilt
for the same reasons it is required when a defendant is entering a plea
of guilty, because adversarial testing of the defendant's guilt is waived
when his attorney tells the jury he is guilty. Jurors are not typically
concerned with the subtleties of legal procedures and will hear the
same affirmation of absolute guilt in an attorney's concession of guilt
that they would hear in a defendant's guilty plea. 10 4
Evidentiary hearings confirmed that Nixon did not expressly con-
sent, 10 5 and silent acquiescence should not be sufficient when a defen-
dant is facing a criminal charge and his attorney tells the jury he is
guilty. 10 6 The attorney for Nixon reported that his client was fully
silent when the strategy of concession was explained. '0 7 The attorney
did not further inquire into why the defendant was unresponsive or
ask for help from anyone to determine why the defendant was unre-
sponsive.'0 8 He did not apparently assess whether Nixon, who was
mentally impaired, understood anything about what was going on at
101. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
102. Nixon v. State, 857 So.2d 172, 174 (Fla. 2003), rev'd, Florida v. Nixon, 543
U.S. 175 (2004), remanded to Nixon v. State, 932 So.2d 1009 (Fla. 2006).
103. Boyhin, 395 U.S. at 243.
104. See Nolan, supra note 85, at 965.
105. Nixon, 857 So.2d at 174.
106. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465-66 (1938).
107. Nixon, 857 So.2d at 174.
108. Id.
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all.109 This could not have been deemed reasonable professional con-
duct if informed consent had been required. 110
Had Nixon chosen to actually plead guilty himself, rather than his
attorney choosing to concede his guilt, Nixon would also have been
afforded the protection of a colloquy from the court.' Before
accepting a guilty plea in a criminal prosecution from a defendant him-
self, the court must conduct a colloquy to determine that the defen-
dant understands the consequences of making such a plea, to inform
him of such consequences if he is not already advised of the conse-
quences and insure that he has made a knowing and deliberate choice
to plead guilty." 2 When Nixon's attorney conceded his guilt, there
was, of course, no colloquy. The Supreme Court has not directly
examined the question of whether trial proceedings which are deemed
to be functionally equivalent to a guilty plea should also require the
protection of a guilty plea colloquy to ascertain informed consent, but
as discussed below, several state courts have dealt with the issue and
are split on its resolution.
When a defendant pleads "not guilty," but then stipulates to a
record of evidence which will ensure conviction, several states require
the trial judge to admonish the defendant of his constitutional rights
as if he had pleaded guilty, because the stipulation to evidence has
become the functional equivalent of a guilty plea.' 3 In the states
which require a guilty plea colloquy in circumstances which are func-
109. Nixon v. State, 572 So.2d 1336 (Fla. 1990), rev'd, 857 So.2d 172 (Fla. 2003),
rev'd, Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004), remanded to Nixon v. State, 932 So.2d
1009 (Fla. 2006).
110. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0 cmt. 7 (2003) ("[A] lawyer may not
assume consent from a client's or other person's silence.").
111. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1-2).
112. Id. (requiring that before a court accepts a plea of guilty, the defendant must be
placed under oath, and the court must address the defendant personally in open
court, informing the defendant of the right to plead not guilty, the right to a jury trial,
the right to be represented by counsel at trial and at every other stage of the
proceeding, the right at trial to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, the
right to be protected from compelled self-incrimination, to testify and present
evidence, and to compel the attendance of witnesses, the nature of each charge to
which the defendant is pleading, any maximum possible penalty, and the court must
address the defendant personally in open court and determine that the plea is
voluntary and did not result from force, threats, or promises). See also Fogus v. United
States, 34 F.2d 97, 98 (4th Cir. 1929) ("Before receiving a plea of guilty in a criminal
case, the court should see that it is made by a person of competent intelligence, freely
and voluntarily, and with a full understanding of its nature and effect, and of the facts
on which it is founded.") (quoting Nicely v. Butcher, 94 S.E. 147, 148 (W.Va. 1917)).
113. See People v. Dorsey, 101 Cal. Rptr. 826 (Cal. Ct. App 1972); Glenn v. United
States, 391 A.2d 772 (D.C. 1978); People v. Gale, 390 N.E.2d 921 (111. App. Ct. 1979);
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tionally equivalent to a guilty plea, the trial judge must question the
defendant in open court about his knowing consent to the stipulations
to be entered or the circumstances which are producing the effect of
rendering his trial a mere formality. 114
Other states have determined that only an actual guilty plea
requires the usual colloquy required from the court to ensure the plea
was voluntary and informed, even if circumstances of a trial do not
leave a reasonable possibility of acquittal." 5 For example, an Iowa
court held that a bench trial on a stipulated factual record should not
be treated the same as a guilty plea proceeding, and due process did
not require the court to undertake a guilty plea colloquy prior to
accepting the stipulated factual record. 16 The reasoning of the Iowa
court was that the decision of guilt still remained with the fact finder,
even when the stipulated evidence was admittedly overwhelming. 17
The Arizona Supreme Court applied a different reasoning to achieve
the same result, stating that the need to maintain the orderly adminis-
tration of justice outweighed the potential prejudice to the accused." 8
The delay and difficulty of determining, case by case, which stipula-
tions were functionally equivalent to a guilty plea prohibited applica-
tion of guilty plea safeguards to stipulations which amount to a guilty
plea. 1
9
On the other hand, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that
regardless of what counsel chooses to call it, a procedure that leaves no
reasonable verdict except guilt demands precisely the same protection
as a guilty plea.' 2 ° A defendant in one Maryland case was prosecuted
for attempted forgery along with breaking and entering and entered a
plea of not guilty on an agreed statement of facts.' 2 ' The arrangement
that had been negotiated with the prosecutor was deemed the func-
tional equivalent of a guilty plea, and the defendant was therefore enti-
tled to formal guilty plea safeguards that would ensure he had
Sutton v. State, 424 A.2d 755 (Md. 1981); Commonwealth v. Duquette, 438 N.E.2d
334 (Mass. 1982); Commonwealth v. Davis, 322 A.2d 103 (Pa. 1974).
114. See Dorsey, 101 Cal. Rptr. 826; Glenn, 391 A.2d 772; Gale, 390 N.E.2d 921;
Sutton, 424 A.2d 755; Duquette, 438 N.E.2d 334; Davis, 322 A.2d 103.
115. See State v Avila, 617 P.2d 1137 (Ariz. 1980); State v. Sayre, 566 N.W.2d 193
(Iowa 1997); State v. Johnson, 689 N.W.2d 247 (Minn.Ct.App. 2004); State v. Mierz,
901 P.2d 286 (Wash. 1995).
116. Sayre, 566 N.W. 2d 193.
117. Id.
118. Avila, 617 P.2d 1137.
119. Id.
120. Yanes v. State, 448 A.2d 359 (Md. 1982).
121. Id.
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knowingly and intentionally consented to the agreement and fully
understood the impact of the stipulated record. 122 This type of
arrangement among counsel is the same as a guilty plea from the
defendant, because the trier of fact could not have arrived at any ver-
dict except guilty. 123
The Illinois Supreme Court has also held that when the prosecu-
tion will present the entire case by stipulation and the defendant does
not present or preserve a defense or when the defendant is stipulating
to any statement that indicates the evidence is sufficient for a convic-
tion, then fundamental due process rights are implicated. 24 Funda-
mental rights to trial can only be waived by the defendant voluntarily
and personally.1
2 5
Following this latter line of reasoning, Nixon had no true opportu-
nity of acquittal when his attorney conceded his guilt, regardless of the
fact that the trial continued. Conceding a defendant's guilt to the jury
is not meaningfully different than stipulating to facts sufficient to pro-
duce a conviction. If Nixon had been given the same procedural safe-
guards as are required for the functional equivalent of a guilty plea, the
trial judge could have addressed the issue of consent in open court in a
colloquy. The judge may have concluded that Nixon did not consent to
the strategy of his attorney conceding his guilt and not allowed the
attorney to make the statement during his opening. The Nixon opin-
ion, as written, does not answer the question of whether the Supreme
Court would have reached the same conclusions had Nixon vehe-
mently denied consent for the attorney's decision to concede his guilt
rather than remaining silent. If the concession of guilt was deemed to
be the functional equivalent of a guilty plea and required colloquy,
however, the line would be clearer, and the decision to concede guilt
would plainly require the consent of the defendant before the judge.
The true irony is that under the current holding, Nixon would
have been given more protection from the court in regard to his under-
standing of the proceeding and his level of consent if he had decided to
plead guilty himself during his trial. If Nixon had pleaded guilty him-
self, the judge would have explained the impact of the plea and made
sure Nixon understood his plea and was acting out of his own inde-
pendent will.1 26 Instead, when Nixon's attorney, who spoke on
Nixon's behalf, chose to concede his guilt, none of the protections of
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. People v. Campbell, 802 N.E.2d 1205 (Ill. 2003).
125. Id.
126. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1-2).
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the court were in place. This is completely inconsistent with the under-
lying purpose of assuring that criminal defendants have the represen-
tation of counsel, which is to increase the defendant's protection, not
to diminish a defendant's protection as he stands trial. 127
Perhaps even more interesting, if Nixon had pleaded guilty on the
advice of his attorney and later challenged his guilty plea through an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he would have had less of a
legal burden to meet to prevail on appeal. 128 If an attorney enters a
guilty plea without the consent of the defendant, then prejudice is pre-
sumed, and the Cronic standard is applied to any claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. 129 To challenge poor guilty plea advice as inef-
fective assistance of counsel rather than a lack of consent, the defen-
dant must first demonstrate under the Strickland standard that his
counsel's guilty plea advice fell below an objective standard of reasona-
bleness for the legal profession. 130 However, under the second prong
of Strickland, a defendant challenging guilty plea advice must prove
only that, but for counsel's advice, he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial.13 ' Conversely, to challenge the
concession of guilt by his attorney as ineffective assistance of counsel,
Nixon was required to prove that the case would have had a different
outcome, if he could have surmounted the reasonableness prong.132
Unfortunately, under the current law, a defendant whose attorney
insists upon conceding his guilt without his consent may be better off
pleading guilty himself and then challenging the validity of his plea.
Although fully discussed in Nixon, there is also no compelling rea-
son to analyze the intent of the attorney in determining whether the
defendant's constitutional rights to trial have been protected. Notably,
Nixon's attorney conceded his client's guilt not out of ill will or incom-
127. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
128. Reid v. True, 349 F.3d 788 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. den., 540 U.S. 1097 (2003)
(stating that a defendant asserting ineffective assistance in connection with guilty plea
must prove a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have
pled guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial). See also U.S. v. Bowman, 348
F.3d 408 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that in an ineffective assistance of counsel challenge
to a guilty plea upon the advice of an attorney, the defendant must prove that the
attorney acted outside of established professional norms and that, but for the
attorney's advice, the defendant would have pleaded not guilty and demanded a trial).
129. Nixon v. State, 857 So.2d 172, 174 (Fla. 2003), rev'd, Florida v. Nixon, 543
U.S. 175 (2004), remanded to Nixon v. State, 932 So.2d 1009 (Fla. 2006).
130. Id.; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
131. Strickland, 466 U.S. 688.
132. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 363 (2000); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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petence but because he likely thought it was his only chance to save
Nixon's life.' 33 Similarly, when record stipulation agreements are
reached that are deemed to be functionally equivalent to guilty pleas,
attorneys are generally also trying to achieve the best sentencing for
their client. 134 Still, in either case, the guilt of the defendant is no
longer truly in question, and the right to have the fact finder determine
guilt as guaranteed by the text of the Constitution is denied. 135 Both
cases are the functional equivalent of a guilty plea, and both should
require informed consent from the defendant, which is most clearly
insured by a judicial colloquy. Not demanding that a court ensure
that a defendant fully consents to having his guilt conceded by his
attorney is completely inconsistent with other measures taken by the
court to ensure that defendants are not compelled to waive their funda-
mental rights.
13 6
133. Nixon v. State, 572 So.2d 1336 (Fla. 1990), rev'd, 857 So.2d 172 (Fla. 2003),
rev'd, Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004), remanded to Nixon v. State, 932 So.2d
1009 (Fla. 2006).
134. See generally State v Avila, 617 P.2d 1137 (Ariz. 1980); People v. Dorsey, 101
Cal. Rptr. 826 (Cal. Ct. App 1972); Glenn v. United States, 391 A.2d 772 (D.C. 1978);
People v. Gale, 390 N.E.2d 921 (Ill.App.Ct. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 944 (1980);
Commonwealth v. Duquette, 438 N.E.2d 334 (Mass. 1982); Sutton v. State, 424 A.2d
755 (Md. 1981); Commonwealth v. Davis, 322 A.2d 103 (Pa. 1974); State v. Sayre, 566
N.W.2d 193 (Iowa 1997); State v. Johnson, 689 N.W.2d 247 (Minn.Ct.App. 2004);
State v. Mierz, 901 P.2d 286 (Wash. 1995); People v. Campbell, 802 N.E.2d 1205 (Ill.
2003); Yanes v. State, 448 A.2d 359 (Md. 1982).
135. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherin the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
136. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529 (1972) ("In ruling that a
defendant has some responsibility to assert a speedy trial claim, we do not depart from
our holdings in other cases concerning the waiver of fundamental rights, in which we
have placed the entire responsibility on the prosecution to show that the claimed
waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made."); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,
70 (1942) ("To preserve the protection of the Bill of Rights for hard-pressed
defendants, we indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of
fundamental rights."); Chambers v. State of Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940)
(holding that it is a miscarriage of justice to allow a coerced confession to be heard at
trial); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy to Use of Bogash, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937) ("[Als the
right of jury trial is fundamental, courts indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver.").
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B. Even if conceding a client's guilt without his consent is not the
functional equivalent of a guilty plea, it should at least require the
constitutional protections given to confessions, and confessions of
guilt require voluntary consent.
The Supreme Court has carefully guarded against the admission
of involuntary statements by criminal defendants to ensure that guilt
is not determined beyond the eyes of the jury and without meaningful
adversarial testing, because to do so would completely undermine the
judicial process. 137 Nixon could not have been forced to testify against
himself nor could he have an involuntary confession to a police officer
heard by the jury. 138 Yet, Nixon's attorney, to whom he had confided
everything, was permitted to speak on Nixon's behalf, as his only rep-
resentative to the court, and deliver an admission of guilt without
Nixon's voluntarily consent. 139 The attorney's concession of his cli-
ent's guilt during his statement to the jury could not be tested by any
adversarial process. To deny Nixon the same protection when his
attorney confesses his guilt as given when a defendant confesses guilt
turns the adversarial system on its ear. If Nixon cannot be made to
testify against himself unless he fully and voluntarily consents, then
he should also be able to prevent an attorney who knows his confes-
sions from uttering the same, unless it is completely voluntary and
consensual.
1. Involuntary confessions cannot be the basis of conviction,
regardless of the weight of the evidence against the accused, and
an involuntary concession by a defendant's attorney should also
be excluded.
In 1897, the Supreme Court firmly established, in Bram v. United
States, that a criminal defendant shall not be convicted based upon a
confession that is not free and voluntary.140 The Court emphasized
that the Fifth Amendment guarantees that a defendant may not be
137. Chambers, 309 U.S. at 241 (1940) (holding that it is a miscarriage of justice to
allow a coerced confession to be heard at trial).
138. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 2. ("[N]or shall [any person] be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."); see also Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532
(1897).
139. Nixon v. State, 857 So.2d 172, 174 (Fla. 2003), rev'd, Florida v. Nixon, 543
U.S. 175 (2004), remanded to Nixon v. State, 932 So.2d 1009 (Fla. 2006).
140. 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897).
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"compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."''
Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to be free of a convic-
tion based upon a coerced confession under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 142 Confessions to police or other officials
that are coerced or compelled may not be used to convict a
defendant. 14
3
The fact that a criminal defendant may not be compelled to be a
witness against himself is true regardless of the strength of the case
against him. In Bram, the defendant, who had been convicted of a
triple murder at sea, had his conviction reversed because the testimony
of a police official who had questioned the defendant was admitted
during trial. 144 The defendant's statement to the officer was deemed
involuntary because it was not made with his free and independent
will. 145 A new trial was ordered even though another witness aboard
the ship testified to being an eyewitness to the triple axe murder. 14 6
Cases that followed Bram have continued to emphasize that if an
involuntary confession is admitted at trial, the judgment of conviction
will be set aside even though the evidence other than the confession
might have been sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict, 147 but this is in
sharp contrast to the analysis used by the Nixon Court.148 If an invol-
untary confession had been admitted at trial against Nixon, then the
sufficiency of the evidence would not have been reviewed at all before
the Court reversed the conviction. However, the sufficiency of the evi-
dence was a primary consideration of the Nixon Court in determining
that the attorney could confess his client's guilt without his voluntary
consent. 149 The Court cited the overwhelming evidence of guilt against
Nixon to support its conclusion that the concession of guilt was an
allowable and reasonable trial strategy. 150 The Court does not give any
indication of whether conceding a client's guilt without consent
141. Id. at 541 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V); see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964) (applying these same rights to the states).
142. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 377 (1964) (holding that allowing the trial
jury to determine if a confession was involuntary, with the instruction to disregard the
confession if found involuntary, was inadequate protection of defendant's right to be
free of conviction based on coerced confession under the Due Process Clause).
143. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944).
144. Bram, 168 U.S. at 537-39.
145. Id. at 562.
146. Id. at 565.
147. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 597 n.1 (1944).
148. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190 (2004).
149. Id.
150. Id.
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should also be seen as a trial strategy, however, when the evidence
against the accused is not overwhelming. 1 5 ' If confessing a client's
guilt without his consent is not a trial strategy when less evidence of
guilt is available, the point at which the evidence is not quite over-
whelming enough is also not indicated by the Court. 152 Just like an
involuntary confession, an involuntary concession of guilt should not
be allowed without any consideration of the weight of the evidence.
Weighing evidence is the traditional and established role of the
fact finder, and it weakens the adversarial system when the weighing of
facts becomes a key factor in determining when constitutional protec-
tions should be applied. In the years since Bram, the Court has
strained repeatedly to rigidly protect the fundamental rights to have a
trial and to not involuntarily testify against oneself, because "the Bill of
Rights was added to the original Constitution in the conviction that too
high a price may be paid even for the unhampered enforcement of the
criminal law and that, in its 'attainment, other social objects of a free
society should not be sacrificed.'
'1 53
2. Voluntary consent must be explicit and supported by, rather than
defeated by, the surrounding circumstances.
Allowing the concession of guilt when the defendant has not
expressly given consent is also irreconcilable with the Court's high
standard of protecting defendants who may appear to speak a confes-
sion freely but were surrounded by circumstances that cast doubt
upon the free and voluntary nature of the confession. In one such
instance, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction for burglary after
determining that a defendant's confession to police was not given with
an adequate level of voluntary consent and independent will. 15 4 The
defendant was questioned for approximately one hour the night of his
arrest and then four more hours the next day. 1 55 During his question-
ing, however, he was not advised of his constitutional rights until after
he made a full oral confession, which he reduced to writing. 156 The
Supreme Court found that the lack of presence of counsel, lack of con-
stitutional warnings, and the lack of food, sleep, and medication cre-
ated circumstances which rendered the defendant's confession to the
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 489 (1944).
154. Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 521 (1968).
155. Id.
156. Id.
[Vol. 29:137
24
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 7
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol29/iss1/7
WITH FRIENDS LIKE You, WHO NEEDS A JURY?
police an involuntary act. 157 Those conditions were enough to sup-
press his confession from being used for any purpose in the trial,
despite the fact that the adult defendant testified that he never
requested food or medication, was not abused or threatened in any
way, and testified that he knew during his interrogation that he had a
constitutional right to refuse to answer any questions, that anything he
said could be used against him and that he had a constitutional right
to retain counsel. 158 The Supreme Court reasoned that the confession
was not credibly a "rational and free choice of the defendant" under
the circumstances of the questioning, and therefore the Court over-
turned his conviction.
159
The Supreme Court also reversed an Arizona criminal conviction
in Mincey, because the defendant's confession was deemed involun-
tary and was not permitted to be used for any purpose in the criminal
trial against the defendant, who offered a hospital-bed confession to
police.' 60 The Arizona Supreme Court had previously found the state-
ment in violation of Miranda16 ' but deemed the confession sufficiently
voluntary to allow its use for impeachment purposes under Harris v.
New York. 162 The Supreme Court disagreed and refused to allow the
confession to be heard by the jury for any purpose because the confes-
sion was not clearly made with Mincey's free volition.' 63 Again, the
Court stated that the defendant's statements were not "the product of
his free and rational choice.'
'1 64
Read together with the legal precedent established regarding the
admission of confessions at trial, Nixon directs a trial court judge to
exclude the defendant's confession to police when the will of the defen-
dant may have been compromised due to sickness, hunger, fatigue or
lack of legal representation. However, the court is to allow the same
defendant's attorney to concede the defendant's guilt without any indi-
cation of his voluntary consent during the trial. To overturn convic-
tions when involuntary confessions are admitted but then to affirm
convictions when the same defendant's attorney stands before the jury
157. Id.
158. Id. at 521-22 (quoting Greenwald v. State, 150 N.W.2d 507, 509 (Wis. 1967)).
159. Id.
160. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 401-02 (1978).
161. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring a warning for defendants
taken into custody prior to questioning to protect right against self-incrimination).
162. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971) (holding that statements made
by a defendant in circumstances violating Miranda are admissible for impeachment if
their trustworthiness satisfies legal standards).
163. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 401.
164. Id. at 401 (quoting Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 521 (1968)).
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and concedes his guilt without the defendant's express and voluntary
consent, is to give effect to a legal technicality. An attorney is guaran-
teed by the Sixth Amendment to assist a defendant in his defense,1 65
and an attorney's well-established role is to speak on behalf of the
defendant. 16 6 When an attorney speaks within his representation of a
defendant and concedes his guilt without express consent, the jury has
essentially heard a compelled confession of the defendant through his
attorney. A confession made at the police station should not be so
fervently protected if the line of protection for the defendant abruptly
ends when the defendant walks into the courtroom. Either way the
jury hears the same statement of guilt, and the defendant has been
denied the true adversarial testing of evidence that is guaranteed by the
Constitution. 16
7
In Bram, Mincey, and other cases, the Supreme Court has pains-
takingly defined the meaning of voluntary consent in reviewing confes-
sions of guilt made by suspects to police and has made clear that
confessions of guilt must be made by the rational, free choosing of the
defendant, or the confession cannot be heard by the jury.' 6 ' This
same deliberate, free choice should apply when an attorney will con-
cede a defendant's guilt before the jury, because conceding guilt to the
jury also presents an indirect admission from the defendant that
removes the doubt of guilt from the jury's consideration. In fact, an
attorney conceding the guilt of his client may be even more convincing
than the testimony of a police officer describing a prior confession,
because the attorney is never cross-examined, and the jury may
assume the defendant's attorney has heard the unfiltered truth from
his client.
165. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
166. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. § 1-2 (2003) ("A lawyer, as a member
of the legal profession, is a representative of clients.... As advocate, a lawyer zealously
asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system.").
167. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
168. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (refusing to allow a confession
obtained by trickery); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961) (requiring a careful evaluation
of all the circumstances of an interrogation prior to admitting a confession of
defendant); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960) ("Coercion can be
mental as well as physical, and the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an
unconstitutional inquisition."); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (finding a
confession involuntary due to beatings of the defendant).
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3. The analogy of confessions to concessions raises policy questions
that should be addressed.
One difference in defendant confessions and an attorney conced-
ing guilt without consent is clear when one of the underlying reasons
for excluding involuntary confessions is examined. When a criminal
defendant's will is broken and he is compelled to utter a confession to
police during questioning, one fear is that the confession is unreliable
and therefore should not be heard by the jury, because it has been
compelled through a perceived or genuine threat or promise of bene-
fit. 1 6 9 The defendant may have confessed guilt to escape the burden of
the questioning itself, and the confession may be completely inaccu-
rate.1 70 The concession of a defendant's guilt by his attorney, on the
other hand, is not likely to carry the same degree of unreliability. In
fact, if the defendant has indeed freely confessed the details of his guilt
to his attorney, then the attorney's statement to the jury that his client
is guilty may be the most reliable statement heard in the courtroom.
However, this defeats the purpose of the Sixth Amendment to provide a
defendant with a trial and a jury of his peers 17 ' and places a burden
and power into the attorney's hands which should make him very
uncomfortable. The judgment of an attorney of the guilt or innocence
of his client should not short-circuit the adversarial system, even
though it may be reliable, because our system of justice is based upon
adversarial testing, and an attorney also can occasionally be wrong in
judging the guilt of a client. This again brings about the unanswered
question of just how much evidence is overwhelming enough to allow a
concession of guilt without consent, and at precisely what point the
attorney's judgment and statement of his client's guilt ceases to
become per se prejudicial to the outcome of the case.' 7 2
Another important underlying reason to guard against the admis-
sion of involuntary statements is completely applicable to an involun-
tary concession of guilt by the attorney. The historical bases of the
Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination, the protection
against unlawful search and seizure of the Fourth Amendment, and the
protection of a trial by a jury in the Sixth Amendment all originated
from a desire to avoid the early English tradition of inquisition and
interrogation and to perpetuate instead "principles of humanity and
169. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 547 (1897).
170. Id.
171. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)
("[T]rial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of
justice ...").
172. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 (1984).
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civil liberty into the criminal justice system."' 73 This protection from
inquisition is arguably eroded when an attorney who has been
entrusted to hear the details of the alleged crime from the defendant
himself has the unseemly power to decide to concede the defendant's
guilt to the jury without his consent. Civility and respect for the adver-
sarial system would perhaps demand that the attorney say nothing at
all in his opening statement, rather than confess to the jury without
express consent that the defendant committed the crime. The strategy
of saying nothing at all or simply explaining the state's burden of proof
would at least force the state to convince the jury of the defendant's
guilt, and the attorney could lose no credibility for the sentencing
phase if he makes no representation at all about the defendant's guilt
during the guilt phase of the trial.
C. The full impact of Nixon upon the legal standard of effective
assistance of counsel is still unclear, but a broad interpretation
could further weaken this constitutional guarantee.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant "the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defence" to ensure a fair trial. 174 By the plain
language of the Amendment, an examination of whether counsel's
efforts actually provided any assistance to the defendant as he faced
prosecution may be helpful in determining if the defendant's rights
were protected. Instead, the Supreme Court has interpreted this guar-
antee by developing the Strickland standard, which examines whether
representation prejudiced the case and whether the representation fell
below a low, ambiguous standard of reasonableness in light of profes-
sional norms. 175 As Justice Marshall noted in his dissent to the opinion
that first established the two-pronged test of Strickland, "[t]o tell law-
yers and the lower courts that counsel for a criminal defendant must
behave 'reasonably' and must act like 'a reasonably competent attor-
ney' . . . is to tell them almost nothing."'1 7 6 A criminal defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel has continued to be weak-
ened under interpretations of Strickland.'77 In many of these cases, the
attorney's behavior was arguably very different from Nixon's attorney,
because the same Strickland standard applies to both patently incom-
173. Brain, 168 U.S. at 544.
174. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
175. See Bibas, supra note 42, at 1; Woessner, supra note 44; Nolan, supra note 85,
at 965; Kirchmeier, supra note 40; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690
(1984).
176. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 707-08 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
177. See Kirchmeier, supra note 40.
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petent performance and to more prepared, well-meaning attorney con-
duct that ultimately infringes upon constitutional rights, as in Nixon.
1. The Strickland standard has been completely swallowed by the
blind deference given to attorneys.
Once the Supreme Court determined that the concession of guilt
was not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea in Nixon, it applied
the Strickland analysis and concluded that the concession of guilt was
a professionally reasonable trial strategy. 78 The Court supported the
reasonableness of this strategy by noting the weight of the evidence and
by citing articles which described that an overall congruent defense
strategy is the best approach in bifurcated capital murder trials.' 79
However, in Nixon the concession of guilt was not actually coupled
with any defense theme or overall congruent strategy as described in
the cited articles.'" 0 Further, juror studies not cited by the Court actu-
ally support that conceding a client's guilt is an extremely ineffective
approach to reducing the probability of a death penalty.',' Some juror
studies suggest that the tactic used in Nixon increases the possibility
that the jury will sentence the accused to death by removing any lin-
gering doubt of guilt.'l 2 Geimer and Amsterdam studied the reports of
post-sentencing jurors in Florida and found that the top reason given
by 69 percent of respondents for recommending life in prison over the
death penalty was some degree of "lingering doubt" of the guilt of the
accused.'8 3 Extensive post-sentencing juror studies conducted by the
Capital Jury Project have also revealed that lingering juror uncertainty
is consistently the single biggest factor in avoiding the death penalty
after murder convictions."8 4 Thus, when the attorney in Nixon con-
ceded his client's guilt, he not only assured a conviction, but he also
178. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. William Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death:
Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 28 (1988);
Michael Mello & Ruthann RobsonJudge Over Jury: Florida's Practice of Imposing Death
Over Life in Capital Cases, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 31, 59-60 (1985); Lawrence T. White,
Juror Decision-Making in the Capital Trial, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 113, 123-26 (1987).
182. See Geimer, supra note 181, at 28; Mello, supra note 181, at 60; White, supra
note 181, at 123-26.
183. Geimer, supra note 181, at 28.
184. William J. Bowers et al., Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing: Jurors'
Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and Premature Decisionmaking, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 1476, 1486-87 (1998). See also Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in
Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1541 (1998).
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removed the greatest barrier the jury perceives to imposing the death
penalty -lingering doubt. 
1 5
However, second-guessing the concession of guilt by Nixon's
attorney is precisely what the Court does not want to do under Strick-
land.18 6 The Court has made clear that the Strickland standard
presumes competence in favor of attorneys, refuses to employ hind-
sight, and allows for a "wide range" of acceptable strategies.'8 7 Defer-
ence must be afforded to criminal defense attorneys facing
retrospective challenges of ineffective assistance of counsel, but this
necessary deference may have been extended too far when conceding
guilt without consent was added to the list of other reasonable trial
behaviors allowed under Strickland."'
Long before Nixon, the constitutional protection of the effective
assistance of counsel had already become feeble under Strickland, even
in cases where attorneys were clearly not as prepared or well-meaning
as Nixon's attorney.18 9 In one case, a defense attorney was appointed
to the case the morning the trial started and had never reviewed the
file, conducted any investigations, or talked to any witnesses.' 90 The
defendant was subsequently sentenced to life in prison for a robbery
conviction.' 91 He was unable to prevail on his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, however, because he could not prove from the
existing trial record that the outcome of his case would have been
different. 1
92
In another case applying Strickland, a defendant was unable to
prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim even though the
lawyer in a capital murder case admitted to sleeping through most of
the trial, explaining that he was accustomed to taking afternoon
185. Garvey, supra note 184, at 1540-42.
186. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
187. Id. at 689 ("A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every
effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the
circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from
counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the
evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.").
188. Id.; see, e.g., Avery v. Procunier, 750 F.2d 444, 447 (5th Cir. 1985); Brimmer v.
State, 29 S.W.3d 497, 509 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998); McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d
482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1119 (1997).
189. See, e.g. Avery, 750 F.2d at 447; Brimmer, 29 S.W.3d at 509; McFarland, 928
S.W.2d 482, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1119 (applying Strickland, 466 U.S. 668).
190. Avery, 750 F.2d at 447.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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naps. 193 The defendant was convicted of capital murder and sen-
tenced to death even though no physical evidence linked him to the
crime, and the only eyewitness changed her description of the
shooter.194 In the appeal, the defendant was unable to prevail on the
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland standard
in part because the defendant was unable to pinpoint exactly when the
chief counsel was sleeping during the proceeding.' 95
Another defendant, who was diagnosed with "atypical psycho-
sis,"' 196 was charged with murder in February of 1990.197 He was
assigned an attorney who did not contact him or order any discovery
for seven months.' 9 8 The attorney did not have a psychiatrist or psy-
chologist examine the defendant prior to hearings, because the attor-
ney believed that psychiatric evidence was nothing but "voodoo."'9 9
The attorney admitted to having "severe alcohol and cocaine abuse
problems" prior to and during the capital murder trial.20 0 According
to others involved in the trial, the attorney would arrive for early morn-
ing meetings with a six-pack of beer, with one or two already gone, and
was constantly inebriated.20 1 The defendant was convicted and sen-
tenced to death.20 2 The Tennessee Criminal Court of Appeals found
that the defendant had not been denied effective assistance of counsel
during the guilt phase of his trial.20 3 The court stated that the attor-
ney's alcohol and cocaine abuse and his complete lack of consultation
with the client were not enough to overturn the conviction because the
193. McFarland, 928 S.W.2d at 508.
194. Jeanette Popp, Another sleeping lawyer case but Texas says he had sufficient
representation, September 23, 2005, http://texasmoratorium.org/mod.php?mod=user
page&menu=130014&page-id=74&group=3 (last visited Oct. 7, 2006).
195. McFarland, 928 S.W.2d at 508 (citing also the presence of junior counsel
assisting the sleeping lawyer during some stages of the trial as a reason not to overturn
the conviction).
196. Brimmer v. State, 29 S.W.3d 497, 505 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).
197. Id. (noting that Brimmer was apprehended several months after the murder
because he was driving the car that had belonged to a victim of the murder).
198. Id. at 512.
199. Id. at 503.
200. Id. at 509.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 506.
203. Id. On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals denied ineffective assistance of
counsel in the guilt phase, and Brimmer's murder conviction stood. The Court of
Appeals did remand for another sentencing hearing, however, because Brimmer's
attorney presented no mitigation evidence during the sentencing phase and did not
object to jury instruction exclusions during sentencing. Litigation over his conviction
continues.
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defendant did not sufficiently prove prejudice under the Strickland
standard.20 4 The United States Supreme Court denied his petition for
writ of certiorari.20 5
As seen in these cases, Strickland has produced a difficult legal
standard of proof to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Strick-
land compels appellate courts to give broad deference to attorneys and
to consider the weight of the evidence in determining whether the
actions of the attorney were unreasonable and prejudicial,20 6 even
though the actions of the attorney may have negatively affected the
appearance of the evidence in the record. A broad reading of Nixon
would further reduce that standard. In Nixon, the Supreme Court's
determination that the concession of guilt without consent does not fall
below a reasonable objective standard of representation further weak-
ens the protection of Sixth Amendment rights under the Strickland
standard because it now arguably allows attorneys to weigh the evi-
dence and effectively take that role from the jury.
2. The initial application of Nixon in recent cases suggests that it
may make the Strickland standard even more difficult and
ambiguous, further weakening the constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel.
Several lower appellate and state courts have already applied
Nixon within the Strickland analysis, and the confusing variety of inter-
pretations of Nixon warrants attention.20 7 The current applications of
Nixon indicate that some courts have ignored or altered Nixon, while
others demonstrated that its impact on the standard for ineffective
assistance of counsel may not be narrowly limited to only bifurcated
death penalty trials with the same overwhelming evidence as seen in
Nixon.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in June 2006, interpreted
the Supreme Court's holding in Nixon to say that the concession of
guilt in the opening statement by Nixon's attorney was the equivalent of
a guilty plea 20 8 and offered only minimal clarification of the impact of
Nixon on the proof of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court
204. Id. at 510 (applying Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)).
205. Brimmer v. Tennessee, 513 U.S. 1020 (1994).
206. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
207. See Atwater v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 799, 808 (11th Cir. 2006); Commonwealth v.
Cousin, 888 A.2d 710, 722 (Pa. 2005); Goodwin v. State, 191 S.W.3d 20, 39 (Mo.
2006); Nance v. Ozmint, 626 S.E.2d 878, 881 (S.C. 2006).
208. Atwater, 451 F.3d at 808 (describing Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187
(2004)).
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denied that the defendant suffered ineffective assistance of counsel
and affirmed the denial of habeas relief for the murder conviction in
Atwater v. Crosby.2°9 Atwater's defense attorney had stated in his clos-
ing argument, without Atwater's consent, that the evidence may sup-
port a guilty verdict for the lesser charge of second-degree murder but
not felony murder.21 ° In upholding Atwater's subsequent death pen-
alty conviction of felony murder, the Eleventh Circuit endorsed the rea-
soning of the Florida Supreme Court. 21  The state court's reasoning,
however, was apparently based upon the earlier Florida Supreme
Court decision which was overturned by the United States Supreme
Court in Nixon eighteen months prior to Atwater.2 12 The Eleventh
Circuit agreed with the State of Florida which argued "that the Florida
State Court was correct in distinguishing Nixon from the instant case,
as the trial strategy that Atwater's counsel employed did not amount to
a guilty plea, but rather was a strategy intended to save Atwater's
life."'2 13 Even though Nixon's attorney also testified that he was trying
to save his client's life,214 the Atwater court cited a differing intent of
the attorney along with the delivery of the concession during the clos-
ing argument, rather than the opening statement, to distinguish
Nixon.215 However, the Atwater court then applied the Strickland stan-
dard, just like the Nixon Court, and quickly dispensed with the appeal
by stating, "[i]n light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt presented
by the State, which we acknowledged in our opinion on the direct
appeal, defense counsel's argument was reasonable. 216
Shortly after the Supreme Court decided Nixon, it also vacated the
state court judgment and remanded Nance v. Ozmint to the Supreme
Court of South Carolina "for further consideration in light of Florida v.
Nixon. ' 217 The South Carolina Supreme Court had originally con-
cluded that defendant Nance's attorney provided ineffective assistance
of counsel and granted Nance a new trial. 218 Despite the United States
209. Id.
210. Id. at 808-09.
211. Id. at 808.
212. See Nixon v. State, 857 So.2d 172, 187 (Fla. 2003), rev'd Florida v. Nixon, 543
U.S. 175 (2004) (reversing Florida Supreme Court and denying ineffective assistance
of counsel), remanded to Nixon v. State, 932 So.2d 1009 (Fla. 2006) (affirming
conviction, denying rehearing and denying habeas relief).
213. Atwater, 451 F.3d at 808-09.
214. Nixon, 543 U.S. at 181.
215. Atwater, 451 F.3d at 808.
216. Id. at 809.
217. Ozmint v. Nance, 543 U.S. 1043 (2005).
218. Nance v. Frederick, 596 S.E.2d 62 (S.C. 2004).
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Supreme Court vacating the decision and remanding the case, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina marched forward with the exact
same result, again granting Nance a new trial on remand. 219
Factually in contrast to Nixon, Nance was sentenced to death after
being represented at trial by an attorney who had suffered from "pneu-
monia, gout, ulcers, diabetes, alcoholism, and congestive heart failure"
and was taking prescription medications including Valium, which
caused impaired memory, sleep interference and sedation.22 ° In the
opening statement, his inexperienced co-counsel introduced the two
defense attorneys as people who did not even want to be there and who
did not wish to represent the defendant.22' Only three witnesses were
later called to testify on behalf of the defense in the guilt phase of the
trial, and each was unprepared.222 The witness list was limited to a
psychologist who was never qualified as an expert, a staff person from
the Department of Corrections who testified only to the defendant's
misbehavior, and the defendant's sister, who testified without context
about the defendant's strange behavior as a child, including accounts
of him killing all of the family pets, pulling a gun on their father, and
trying to bury his brother alive.223 After conviction, during the death
penalty sentencing phase, the testimony presented by the defense
attorney took only seven minutes, with the trial judge even attempting
to intervene to encourage the defense attorney to provide further miti-
gating evidence.224
Dismissing any real impact from the holding in Nixon during its
reconsideration of Nance, the South Carolina Supreme Court arguably
mischaracterized the holding in Nixon as one involving the submission
of a guilty plea:
In Nixon, the United States Supreme Court held that entering a guilty
plea on behalf of a defendant without his express consent did not con-
stitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court opined that the
decision to plead guilty was a strategy employed by trial counsel in an
effort to present mitigating evidence at sentencing in an attempt to
save the defendant's life. 225
219. Nance v. Ozmint, 626 S.E.2d 878 (S.C. 2006). The United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari on October 2, 2006 ( No. 05-1580). This could indicate that
the Court ultimately agreed with South Carolina that Nixon was essentially
inapplicable to the case at bar, or certiorari may have been denied for other reasons.
220. Id. at 881.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 881-82.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 882.
225. Id. at 880 (internal citations omitted).
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The South Carolina Supreme Court then concluded that in light of
Nixon, Nance's defense still fell into one of the rare circumstances in
which the Cronic standard of presumed prejudice must be applied
because the adversarial system had completely failed.226 The court
granted Nance a new trial once again,227 and Nixon had no impact on
the clear denial of Nance's constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel.
Even if the South Carolina court had not characterized Nixon as a
case about guilty plea submissions, Nance still would have provided no
real insight into how a court may apply Nixon, however, because the
issues in Nance had little to do with the holding in Nixon.228 There
was no concession of guilt in an attempt to save the defendant's life in
Nance, but instead there was just a very weak, inadequate and unpre-
pared presentation of a defense effort. 229 The interesting part of the
analysis of Nance, however, is to consider why the United States
Supreme Court believed Nixon warranted the remand and reconsidera-
tion of Nance.230 The United States Supreme Court may view Nixon
more broadly, as signaling an even more rigorous scrutiny of all inef-
fective assistance of counsel claims, even in cases like Nance, but this
remains to be seen in future cases.
Applying Nixon to a somewhat more similar case, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania conducted a thorough analysis in extending
Nixon to apply to Common Wealth v. Cousin.2 3 1 The defense attorney
in Cousin admitted that to avoid a conviction for a higher degree of
criminal homicide, he had conceded the defendant's guilt to voluntary
manslaughter during the closing argument, having never even dis-
cussed the strategy with his client.2 3 2 The defense attorney in Cousin
conceded the defendant's guilt without consent, but he did so without
the compelling need to avoid a death penalty.23 3 In conducting its
analysis, the Pennsylvania court reasoned around a section of key limit-
ing language in Nixon. 234 The United States Supreme Court had
warned that although it determined the concession of Nixon's guilt did
not destroy his right to an adversarial trial, "such a concession in a
226. Id. at 881.
227. Id.
228. Compare Nixon v. State, 857 So.2d 172, 174 (Fla. 2003), and Nance v. Ozmint,
626 S.E.2d 878, 881 (S.C. 2006).
229. Nance, 626 S.E.2d at 881.
230. Ozmint v. Nance, 543 U.S. 1043 (2005).
231. 888 A.2d 710 (Pa. 2005).
232. Id. at 714.
233. Id. at 721.
234. Compare id., and Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190-91 (2004).
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run-of-the-mine trial might present a closer question, the gravity of the
potential sentence in a capital trial and the proceeding's two-phase
structure vitally affect counsel's strategic calculus. ' 235 The Penn-
sylvania court stated that even though the attorney in Cousin was not
trying to save his client from a death penalty by conceding guilt with-
out consent, the possibility of a death penalty was only one basis for
the Nixon Court's decision that an attorney's nonconsensual conces-
sion was reasonable conduct, and "it does not follow that the Court's
holding in that case was meant to apply only in death penalty
cases."
236
Following Nixon, the Pennsylvania court then applied Strickland
rather than the presumptive prejudice standard of Cronic, stating
"there are multiple scenarios in which a defense attorney may reasona-
bly determine that the most promising means of advancing his client's
interests is to admit what has become plain to all concerned."2 37 The
court did not explain what could be included in "multiple scenarios"
but seemed to give expansive application to the deference to attorneys
suggested by Nixon.2 38 The Pennsylvania court did suggest an outer
limit to the extension of Nixon, however, stating that certain circum-
stances, such as an attorney contradicting his own client's testimony by
conceding guilt which had been affirmatively denied in testimony by
the defendant, could be presumptively prejudicial and require applica-
tion of the Cronic standard.239 The suggestion that an attorney must
actually contradict and impeach his own client to be presumed ineffec-
tive when conceding the client's guilt without consent serves to further
extend the Nixon distortion of effective adversarial representation.
Nance, Atwater and particularly Cousin demonstrate how the
application of Nixon could create an even more confused, weakened
and unpredictable standard of effective assistance of counsel under
Strickland.240 Although it may be more embarrassing to the profession
to allow a drunk, asleep or unprepared attorney to pass as effective
counsel, permitting the nonconsensual concession of guilt of a defen-
235. Nixon, 543 U.S. at 190-91.
236. Cousin, 888 A.2d at 722.
237. Id. at 719 (emphasis added).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 716 (citing State v. Anaya, 592 A.2d 1142 (N.H. 1991)). In Anaya, the
defendant had plead guilty and testified to his complete innocence during the trial, but
his attorney contradicted the defendant's testimony by admitting his guilt to a lesser
charge in the closing argument.
240. Id. at 719; Ozmint v. Nance, 543 U.S. 1043 (2005); Atwater v. Crosby, 451
F.3d 799, 808 (11th Cir. 2006) (applying Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984) and Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004)).
[Vol. 29:137172
36
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 7
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol29/iss1/7
WITH FRIENDS LIKE You, WHO NEEDS A JURY?
dant on a case-by-case basis is even more dangerous to the health of the
adversarial system and the established role of counsel.
The "paramount importance of vigorous representation follows
from the nature of our adversarial system of justice,"241 and allowing
an attorney to concede the guilt of a client without consent defeats the
purpose of the attorney's representation. Certainly, as a civilized soci-
ety, we need guilty murderers to be convicted but not by their attor-
neys. "The very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is
that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the
ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go
free."242 The role of the attorney in our adversarial system is to be an
advocate, and in representing a client, one author notes, "[gluilt or
innocence do not figure into the equation; that is for the jury to decide,
not the attorney. "243
As Justice Anstead noted in a concurrence to the Florida Supreme
Court decision, "[dlespite his difficult behavior, Nixon was still enti-
tled to his constitutional rights. Without the benefit of these rights, we
can place no credence in the jury's verdict of guilt in this case. Any
other conclusion would rend the very fabric from which our justice
system was woven. "244 The adversarial process protected by the Sixth
Amendment "can only be attained where counsel acts in the role of an
active advocate in behalf of his client, ' 24 5 and conceding guilt before
the jury, in the opening statement is simply not active advocacy, even
when the intent is benevolent.
To retain the constitutional protections of the Sixth Amendment, a
defendant's express consent should be required for any trial strategy
which involves the attorney conceding the client's guilt before the jury,
and in the absence of such consent, the result should be the presump-
tion of prejudice in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The cur-
rent rule established in Nixon should be narrowly interpreted to avoid
a further dilution of the important constitutional right to the effective
assistance of counsel.
241. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988).
242. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975).
243. STEVEN LUBET, NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH: WHY TRIAL LAWYERS DON'T, CAN'T AND
SHOULDN'T HAVE TO TELL THE WHOLE TRUTH 171 (New York University Press 2001).
244. Nixon v. State, 857 So.2d 172, 179 (Fla. 2003) (Anstead, J., concurring)
(quoting Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So.2d 618, 626 (Fla. 2000) (Harding, CJ.,
concurring)).
245. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); see also Jones v. Barnes, 463
U.S. 745, 758 (1983).
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II. EVEN IF THE SUPREME COURT DOES NOT FURTHER ADDRESS THE
CONCESSION OF GUILT BY CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEYS, THE LEGAL
PROFESSION SHOULD DO SO BY CLARIFYING ETHICAL
STANDARDS FOR DEFENSE COUNSEL.
The Supreme Court has been urged to make attorneys more
accountable for the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective counsel
prior to Nixon, and yet, the standards of protection have weakened;2 46
however, the dilemma can be vigorously addressed through profes-
sional standards to preserve the adversarial system. Challenges in the
interpretation of the standard for effective assistance of counsel can be
addressed by the legal profession, which can prevent further degenera-
tion by clarifying the established professional norms. As one scholar
stated, "[tlhe low standard for effective assistance of counsel under the
Sixth Amendment should not be mistaken for competent representa-
tion." '247 The Court's interpretation of the meaning of effective counsel
should not define our standard as a profession of what is acceptable
when defending an accused. In fact, the Supreme Court stated that the
"Sixth Amendment refers simply to 'counsel,' not specifying particular
requirements of effective assistance. It relies instead on the legal profes-
sion's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's presump-
tion that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the
Amendment envisions. 24 8
As a professional field that self-governs, our own code of ethics
must reflect a higher standard that would ensure the rights of clients
who are facing the loss of their life or liberty. In Strickland, the
Supreme Court stated that the "purpose of the effective assistance
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of
legal representation. '249 However, all attorneys admitted to the bar do
have the ethical duty to "seek improvement of ... the administration of
justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession. '25 0
246. See Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 299 (1983); Jeffrey Levinson, Note, Don't Let Sleeping
Lawyers Lie: Raising the Standard for Effective Assistance of Counsel, 38 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 147 (2001); Bibas, supra note 42, at 1; Kirchmeier, supra note 40, at 427;
Woessner, supra note 44, at 348; Bright, supra note 46.
247. Paul J. Kelly, Jr., CJ., 10th Cir., Are We Prepared To Offer Effective Assistance
Of Counsel?, Speech delivered at the 2000 Adler Rosecan Jurist-In-Residence Program
(2000), in 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1089, Fall 2001, at 1093.
248. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (emphasis added).
249. Id. at 689.
250. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. § 6 (2003).
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For two important reasons, the Rules of Professional Conduct2 51
should include the need for express consent from a client anytime
defense counsel plans to concede a client's guilt as a strategy in a crim-
inal trial. First, requiring express consent as a matter of professional
ethics prior to conceding a criminal defendant's guilt would help
ensure that defendants like Nixon, who suffered mental illness, would
have necessary procedural protections, such as the appointment of a
guardian ad litem. Second, the legal profession should demand higher
standards of criminal defendant representation to preserve our system
of advocacy and to promote more consistency in our professional
standards.
A. Currently there are no clear professional standards that apply to
conceding a client's guilt.
Currently in the American Bar Association Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, the concession of guilt of criminally accused defend-
ants is not directly addressed.2 52 In describing a lawyer's duty in
establishing the objectives of representation, the Rules state that a
"lawyer shall abide by a client's decision. '2 53 As described in Rule 1.4,
a lawyer "shall . . . reasonably consult with the client about the means
by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished.21 54 There are
certain specific circumstances in which a lawyer "shall abide by the
client's decision. "255 These circumstances include the decision
"whether to settle a matter" in a civil case and in a criminal case "as to
a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client
will testify. '2 56 In addition, as required by the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure, a guilty plea may not be accepted until the judge has
conducted colloquy with the defendant, ensuring he understands the
basis of the plea, the potential sentencing, and that the decision was
completely voluntary and informed.257
B. Express consent prior to concession of guilt should be required to
protect the defendant.
When an attorney will concede a defendant's guilt in front of the
jury, informed consent should be required to provide the defendant
251. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2003).
252. See id.
253. Id. R. 1.2(a).
254. Id. R. 1.4(a) (emphasis added).
255. Id. R. 1.2(a) (emphasis added).
256. Id. (emphasis added).
257. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1-2).
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with the same protections currently available when a defendant pleads
guilty, and these protections are particularly important when a defen-
dant has diminished capacity.258 Joe Elton Nixon had diminished
capacity, including a history of mental illness and possible brain dam-
age, and he was uncooperative and disruptive at times.259 Nixon's law-
yer reported three attempts to discuss his strategy of conceding guilt
with Nixon, who remained unresponsive. 260 The attorney did not con-
tinue to attempt communication, and he did not seek outside assis-
tance from family or from mental health professionals to try to elicit
some response.2 6
Gaining express consent from an uncooperative, juvenile or men-
tally diminished client is challenging, and this is already an issue when
considering other decisions attorneys must make with their clients.262
The American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct
clearly state that "a lawyer may not assume consent from a client's or
other person's silence: '263 When capacity is questioned in situations
which require consent such as entering a guilty plea, "the option cho-
sen by most capital defense attorneys in this situation is to seek a
mental examination of the client.12 64 If a client is deemed competent,
he or she is then "presumptively entitled to make fundamental deci-
sions regarding his or her case. "265
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct also provide direction
when a client may not be deemed competent:
When a lawyer reasonably believes the client has diminished capacity,
is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action
is taken and cannot adequately act in the client's own interest, the law-
258. See Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306 (1979); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389
(1993); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
259. Nixon v. State, 572 So.2d 1336 (Fla. 1990).
260. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 181 (2004).
261. Nixon v. State, 572 So.2d 1336 (Fla. 1990).
262. See Diane E. Hoffman, Mediating Life and Death Decisions, 36 Axiz. L. REv. 821
(1994); Vance L. Cowden & Geoffrey R. McKee, Competency to Stand Trial in Juvenile
Delinquency Proceedings: Cognitive Maturity and the Attorney-Client Relationship, 33 U.
OF LouISVILLE J. of FAM. L. 629 (1995); Victor L. Streib, Standing Between the Child and
the Executioner: The Special Role of Defense Counsel in Juvenile Death Penalty Cases, 31
AM. J. CRIM. L. 67 (2003); Beth A. Danon, Special Focus: Disability Law: Ethical
Considerations When Representing a Client who is "Under a Disability," 28 VER. B. J. &
L. DIG. 62 (2002).
263. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.1.0 cmt 7 (2003).
264. Streib, supra note 262, at 73-74.
265. Christopher Slobogin & Amy Mashburn, Symposium, The Criminal Defense
Lawyer's Fiduciary Duty to Clients with Mental Disability, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1581,
1584 (2000).
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yer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including consult-
ing with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to
protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of
a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.2 66
The comments also suggest that if an attorney is in doubt when com-
municating with a client who may have diminished capacity, then it is
appropriate if the client wishes, "to have family members or other per-
sons participate in discussions with the lawyer.
2 67
Under current standards, Joe Elton Nixon was not required to give
his express, informed consent to the strategy of concession. Therefore,
these careful evaluative and protective measures were never afforded to
him, even though his attorney argued during sentencing that he had a
history of mental illness, psychiatric care, a low IQ, and possibly brain
damage.26 8 Professionally requiring attorneys to obtain the same con-
sent to the concession of guilt by the attorney as currently required for
a guilty plea may help ensure the necessary precautions are taken to
protect the rights of all defendants but particularly those with dimin-
ished capacity.
C. Express consent before conceding guilt should be required to protect
the adversarial system and to promote more consistent professional
standards.
In the preamble to the American Bar Association Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, the responsibility of a lawyer is described as
that of a zealous advocate. 26 9 The responsibility of maintaining the
rights of the accused and the integrity of representation is a duty of
every lawyer because, "lawyers are the brains and backbone of our
criminal adversarial system. "270 The first goal of a defense attorney
should be to act as an advocate for her client, maintaining the defen-
dant's innocence until guilt is proven. In cases where attorneys are
faced with criminal defendants who may indeed be guilty of horrible
crimes, society needs a conviction. Conviction should result, however,
because "the government's case has survived . . . meaningful adver-
sarial testing, not because their attorneys made the decision, for
266. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(b) (2003).
267. Id. at Note 3.
268. Nixon v. State, 572 So.2d 1336 (Fla. 1990).
269. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. §2 (2003) ("as advocate, a lawyer
zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system").
270. Major Edye U. Moran, Pyrrhic Victories and Permutations: New Developments in
the Sixth Amendment, Discovery and Mental Responsibility, 1998 ARMY LAW. 106, 117
(1998).
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whatever reason, to abandon their role as the defendant's advocate in
our adversarial criminal justice system by conceding the defendant's
guilt to the jury. '271 When, in the rare circumstance that an attorney
believes that conceding guilt is his only viable strategy, the American
Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct should clearly
require that the client expressly consent to this strategy.
Although it is arguably the functional equivalent of a guilty plea,
conceding a criminal client's guilt is not currently one of the circum-
stances in which a lawyer "shall abide by the client's decision. "272
Interestingly, one of the circumstances that does command the lawyer
to abide by the client's wishes is the decision "whether to settle a mat-
ter" in a civil case.273 Settling a civil case, which may or may not entail
admitting liability, requires more consent from a client than conceding
a criminal defendant's guilt to the jury in a murder trial.274
Although not protected at all by the Sixth Amendment, the inclu-
sion of "whether to settle a matter" in a civil case is arguably analogous
to the concession of guilt of the criminally accused by his attorney and
presents an interesting question of how lawyers currently approach the
ethical issues of representation. Imagine the ridiculous result of
extending the holding in Nixon to an analogous situation in a civil
liability case. Hypothetically, a large home-improvement chain is sued
for knowingly allowing unsafe store conditions which allegedly caused
the injuries and deaths of hundreds of shoppers and employees, all in
an attempt to save money for the corporation. The corporate execu-
tives are sitting in their ties and suits near the civil defense attorney as
the trial begins. Wishing to maintain his own credibility with the jury,
the corporate defense attorney, without express consent from the cli-
ent, decides to tell the jury in his opening statement that the corporate
executives actually did knowingly allow all of the horrendous safety
violations. The attorney then states that his client is absolutely liable
but asks the jury to go light on the award of damages because this
corporation has done nice things for the community.
The legal profession and the corporate defendant, of course,
would be outraged by this conduct from the attorney, regardless of
how weighty and despicable the evidence was against the corporation.
As a profession, we appear to fully expect civil defense attorneys to
zealously advocate for clients even if they know the client should be
liable, but then, we hypocritically allow criminal defense attorneys to
271. Woessner, supra note 44, at 348.
272. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2003) (emphasis added).
273. Id. (emphasis added).
274. Id.
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concede guilt before a jury without the client's consent when life and
liberty are at stake. Of course, Nixon will never be extended to civil
liability cases, but why should less vigorous advocacy and less exact-
ing client consent be accepted when an attorney defends a client who
may be sentenced to death than when he defends one who may lose
money for his misconduct?
To remedy professional hypocrisy and maintain our valued crimi-
nal justice system of "innocent until proven guilty," our professional
standards must directly address the attorney's role when representing
a criminal client with substantial evidence against him. Attorneys
need to be encouraged to allow the adversarial system to work as it was
intended to work. In the cases in which concession of guilt is part of a
strategy, the defendant must have the final decision whether to pursue
this strategy for the same well-established reasons he must decide "as
to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the
client will testify. 275 Allowing an attorney to relinquish his role as a
zealous advocate and concede a client's guilt without his consent is
damaging to the profession and the criminal justice system.
CONCLUSION
Even when a criminal defendant has overwhelming evidence
against him, the Sixth Amendment protection of effective assistance of
counsel is critical to our system of justice. Defending clients with a
strong adversarial argument enriches the judicial process and ensures
that juries and not attorneys determine the guilt of the accused. The
Supreme Court's interpretation of standards for effective assistance of
counsel continues to steadily diminish the constitutional rights of
defendants. Nixon has the potential to further dilute the standards for
effective representation for all criminal defendants without providing
limiting factors of precisely when the concession of guilt by an attor-
ney is appropriate without the consent of the client and when evidence
is sufficiently overwhelming. If we allow the adversarial system to be
diminished to the point that lawyers may unilaterally choose to con-
cede guilt as a substitute for contesting the guilt of the accused, not
only will the judicial system, legal profession and criminal defendants
suffer, but the constitutional guarantees of a fair trial will be signifi-
cantly diluted. Attorneys carry the burden of protecting the health of
the adversarial system and must demand higher standards for effective
275. Id.
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assistance of counsel to ensure the constitutional rights of those whose
lives depend upon our skills of advocacy.
Sharon G. Scudder
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